Abstract-In this paper, we consider linear quadratic team problems with an arbitrary number of quadratic constraints in stochastic and deterministic settings. The team consists of players with different measurements about the state of nature. The objective of the team is to minimize a quadratic cost subject to additional finite number of quadratic constraints. We first consider the problem of a countably infinite number of players in the team for a bounded state of nature with a Gaussian distribution and show that linear decisions are optimal. Then, we consider the problem of team decision problems with additional convex quadratic constraints and show that linear decisions are optimal for the finite and infinite number of players in the team. For the finite player case, the optimal linear decisions can be found by solving a semidefinite program. We then consider the problem of minimizing a quadratic objective for the worst case scenario, subject to an arbitrary number of deterministic quadratic constraints. We show that linear decisions are optimal and can be found by solving a semidefinite program. Finally, we apply the developed theory on dynamic team decision problems in linear quadratic settings.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
E consider the problem of distributed decision making with information constraints and quadratic constraints under linear quadratic settings. For instance, information constraints appear naturally when making decisions over networks. Quadratic constraints in control problems have received a lot of attention in the literature, see, for instance, [1] and the references therein. An example of a quadratic constraint is the power limitation imposed on the controllers in practice. Also, one often has multiple objectives, possibly conflicting, that need to be satisfied simultaneously. Distributed decision problems (with respect to information constraints) can be formulated as team problems. The team problem is an optimization problem with several decision makers possessing different information aiming to optimize a common objective. Early results in [2] , motivated by distributed organization problems in economics and biology, considered static team theory in stochastic settings and a more general framework was introduced by Radner [3] and existence and uniqueness results were shown. GeneralizaManuscript received August 11, 2015 ; revised November 7, 2015 tion to dynamic team problems for control of network systems was introduced in [4] , and established the connection of team decision theory and distributed control over networks. In [5] , the deterministic team problem with two team members was solved. The solution cannot be easily extended to more than two players since it uses the fact that the two members have common information; a property that does not necessarily hold for more than two players. Also, a nonlinear team problem with two team members was considered in [6] , where one of the team members is assumed to have full information whereas the other member has only access to partial information about the state of the world. Related team problems with exponential cost criterion were considered in [7] . Optimizing team problems with respect to affine decisions in a minimax quadratic cost were shown to be equivalent to stochastic team problems with exponential cost, see [8] . The connection is not clear when the optimization is carried out over nonlinear decision functions. The deterministic version (minimizing the worst case scenario) of the linear quadratic team decision problem was solved in [9] . The problem of countably infinite number of players under the power seminorm was solved in [10] under certain assumptions. In [11] , the optimization is made with respect to linear decisions, as opposed to our paper where we consider showing the optimality of linear decisions. The work in [12] relies on the (unconstrained) result by Radner [3] . In Radner, it is shown that linear decisions are optimal in the unconstrained case.
Then, the paper above shows that if we assume linear decisions, then partial nestedness subject to linear decisions and quadratic invariance are equivalent. Thus, quadratic invariance does not prove optimality of linear decisions. Once we add additional quadratic constraints, quadratic invariance cannot rely on the result by Radner, and it is unclear if linear decisions are optimal.
In this paper, we will consider Gaussian and deterministic settings (worst case scenario) for team decision problems under additional quadratic constraints. It is well known that additional constraints, although convex, could give rise to complex optimization problems if the optimized variables are functions (as opposed to real numbers). For instance, linear functions (that is, functions of the form μ(x) = Kx where K is a real matrix) are no longer optimal. We will illustrate this fact by the following example. Some Hilbert space theory shows that the optimal u is given by
Obviously, the optimal u is a nonlinear function of x. Increasing the dimension of x, and adding constraints on the structure of u, for instance, x ∈ R N and u = μ(x) = (μ(x 1 ), . . . , μ(x N )), certainly makes the constrained optimization more complicated. The example above shows that despite having convex optimization carried out over a Hilbert space, the optimal decision function is nonlinear. However, we show in the upcoming sections that problems with multiple quadratic constraints behave nicely when considering the expected values of the objectives in the Gaussian case, in the sense that linear decisions are optimal. We also extend the results to the case of an infinite number of players in the team. For the deterministic counterpart, which is not an optimization problem over a Hilbert space, we show that linear decisions are optimal and we show how to find the linear optimal decisions by semidefinite programming. Finally, we apply the developed theory to dynamic team decision problems in linear quadratic settings.
II. NOMENCLATURE
The following table gives a list of the notations we are going to use throughout this paper:
Set of non-negative real numbers. N Set of positive integers. S n Set of n × n symmetric matrices. S n + Set of n × n symmetric positive semidefinite matrices. S n ++ Set of n × n symmetric positive definite matrices. M Set of measurable functions. C Set of functions μ :
Tr{A} is the trace of the matrix A. N (m, X) Set of Gaussian variables with mean m and covariance X.
III. LINEAR QUADRATIC GAUSSIAN TEAM THEORY
In this section, we will review a classical result in stochastic team theory for a finite number of decision variables and present an extension to the case of an infinite number of decision variables.
In the static team decision problem, we have a state of nature x, which we assume to be a Gaussian variable taking values in R n and x ∼ N (0, X). Also, we have a set of N players constituting a team, where each player has access to a local measurement of the state x. The measurement available to the team is denoted by y = (y * 
Let C denote the set of functions μ :
Consider a matrix
with R ∈ S m ++ . The objective of the team is to solve
If full state information about x is available to each decision maker u i , the minimizing u can be found easily by completion of squares. It is given by u = Lx, where L is the solution to
Then, the cost function in (2) can be rewritten as
Minimizing the cost function J(x, u) is equivalent to minimizing
The next result is due to Radner [3] , showing that linear decisions are optimal for the finite-dimensional static team problem.
Proposition 1 (Radner) : Let x and v i be Gaussian variables with zero mean, taking values in R n and R p i , respectively, with
Then, the optimal decision μ to the optimization problem
is unique and linear in y.
Proof: For a proof, see [3] . It is not clear how to extend the result above to the case of an infinite number of state and decision variables, that is, N = ∞. This is an important case to approach dynamic team problems, where the decision variables are over space and time, and the time horizon that goes to infinity.
The next theorem establishes a generalization of the above proposition for the infinite-dimensional case. ; R as an infinite-dimensional, bounded, positive definite, and self-adjoint linear operator; L as a bounded linear operator; and C i ∈ R p i ×∞ as a bounded linear operator, for all i ∈ N. Then, the optimal decision μ to the optimization problem
Proof: Note first that y i is bounded since C i , x, and v i are bounded.
Let Z be the linear space of functions such that
Since R is a bounded symmetric positive definite linear operator, Z is a linear space under the inner product g, h = E{g * Rh} and norm
The optimization problem in (5), where we search for the linear optimal decision, can be written as
Finding the best linear optimal decision u ∈ Z to the above problem is equivalent to finding the shortest distance from the subspace Z to the element Lx (Lx is bounded since L and x are bounded), where the minimizing u is the projection of Lx on Z and, hence, unique. Also, since u is the projection, we have
The Gaussian assumption implies that
Hence, for any decision μ ∈ M ∩ C, linear or nonlinear, we have that
with equality if and only if μ(y)= u . This concludes the proof.
IV. TEAM DECISION PROBLEMS WITH POWER CONSTRAINTS
In practice, we often have power constraints on the control variables of the form
The question is whether linear decisions are optimal and if there is a practical algorithm that can obtain optimal decisions. The introductory example clearly showed that linear decisions are not optimal for the case of point-wise optimization with a power constraint. Thus, there is no reason to expect that linear decisions are optimal for the stochastic (average) case. This will be addressed in this section.
Consider the modified version of the optimization problem (2)
The difference from Radner's original formulation is that we have added power constraints to the decision functions γ j ≥ E|μ j (y j )| 2 . Note that additional constraints in functional optimization could give rise to a complex nonlinear optimal solution as was shown in Example 1 in the introduction.
In the sequel, we will prove a more general theorem, where we consider power constraints on a set of quadratic forms in the state x and the decision function μ.
Theorem 2: Let x be a Gaussian variable with zero mean and given covariance matrix X, taking values in R n . Also, let
and
Assume that the optimization problem
is feasible. Then, linear decisions μ given by μ(x) = K(X)x, with K(X) ∈ K, are optimal. Proof: Consider the expression
with λ j ≥ 0 for all j. Take the expectation of a quadratic form with index j to be larger than γ j . Then, λ j → ∞ makes the value of the expression above infinite. On the other hand, if the expectation of a quadratic form with index j is smaller than γ j , then the maximizer λ j is optimal for λ j = 0. Now let p be the optimal value of the optimization problem (8) , and consider the objective function
We have that Now assume that p > 0. We have
Now introduce λ 0 and the matrix
and consider the minimax problem
(10) Note that a maximizing λ 0 must be positive, since λ 0 = 0 implies that p 0 ≤ 0, while λ 0 > 0 gives p 0 > 0. We can always recover the optimal solutions of (9) from that of (10) by dividing all variables by λ 0 , that is p = p 0 /λ 0 , λ j → λ j /λ 0 , and μ → μ/λ 0 . Now we have the obvious inequality (min max{·} ≥ max min{·})
For any fixed values of λ j , we have R 0, so Theorem 1 gives the equality
where the minimizing K is unique. Thus
The objective function is radially unbounded in K since R 0. Hence, it can be restricted to a compact subset of K. Thus
where the equality is obtained by applying Proposition 2 in the Appendix, the second inequality follows from the fact that the set of linear decisions Kx, K ∈ K, is a subset of C, and the second equality follows from the definition of p 0 . Hence, linear decisions are optimal, and the proof is complete.
Remark: Although Theorem 1 is stated and proved for y = x and u = μ(y) = μ(x) with μ ∈ C, it extends easily to the case y = Cx for any matrix C, which is often the case in applications. Note also that we may set N = ∞ and the result would still hold by using Theorem 2 in the proof.
V. COMPUTATION OF THE OPTIMAL TEAM DECISIONS
The optimization problem that we would like to solve when assuming linear decisions is
with H 0. Note that we can write the constraints as
where we used that Exx * = X = H 2 . Hence, we obtain a set of convex quadratic inequalities (convex since R j 0 for all j)
There are many existing computational methods to solve convex quadratic optimization problems (see [13] ). Alternatively, we can formulate the optimization problem as a set of linear matrix inequalities as follows. For simplicity, we will assume that R j 0 for all j. (The case R j 0 is analog with some technical conditions.)
Theorem 3: The team optimization problem (11) is equivalent to the semidefinite program
Proof: Introduce the matrices P j ∈ S n , and write the given constraints as
Now we have that
Since R j 0, the quadratic inequality above can be transformed to a linear matrix inequality using the Schur complement ( [13] ), which is given by
Hence, our optimization problem to be solved is given by
which proves our theorem.
VI. DETERMINISTIC TEAM PROBLEMS WITH QUADRATIC CONSTRAINTS
We considered the problem of a static stochastic team decision in the previous sections. This section treats an analogous version for the deterministic (or worst case) problem. For the dynamic setting with partially nested information (which will be discussed in the next section), this corresponds to the H ∞ control problem. Although the problem formulation is very similar, the ideas of the solution are considerably different and, in a sense, more difficult. The deterministic problem considered is a quadratic game between a team of players and nature. Each player has limited information that could be different from the other players in the team. This game is formulated as a minimax problem, where the team is the minimizer and nature is the maximizer.
Consider the following team decision problem:
where
We will be interested in the case R 0. The players u 1 , . . . , u N make up a team, which plays against nature represented by the vector x, using μ ∈ S, that is
Now consider the team problem (16) and note that an equivalent condition for the existence of a decision function μ ∈ C that achieves the value of the game γ is that
for all x. This is equivalent to
for all x. This is an example of a quadratic constraint. We could also have a set of quadratic constraints that have to be mutually satisfied. For instance, in addition to the minimization of the worst case quadratic cost, we could have constraints on the induced norms of the decision functions
or equivalently given by the quadratic inequalities
Also, the team members could share a common power source, and the power is proportional to the squared norm of the
for some positive real number c. It is not clear whether linear decisions are optimal, since the example given in the introduction indicates that, in deterministic settings, nonlinear decisions are optimal pointwise. Theorem 4: Let
Then, there exists a linear decision μ(x) = Kx, K ∈ K, such that (17) is satisfied. Proof: Suppose there exists a decision function μ ∈ C such that (17) is satisfied. Then, for any Gaussian variable x ∼ N (0, X), we have that
Equivalently, for a given x ∼ N (0, X), the optimal value s of the optimization problem
must be nonpositive, s ≤ 0. But Theorem 2 gives that the decision function μ(x) = K(X)x is optimal, with K(X) ∈ K.
Since Exx * = X, we obtain the inequalities
for all j. Now let λ i ≥ 0, i = 0, . . . , M, and
Introduce the set
The fact that for every covariance matrix X there is a matrix K(X) such that (19) holds implies
For every fixed X, we have a max-min problem which is convex in K and linear in λ i , so we can switch the order of the minimization and maximization to obtain the max-min-max inequality
which is equivalent to the existence of a matrix K ∈ K such that
This implies that there must exist a matrix K ∈ K such that
for all j. Finally, (20) implies that
and the proof is complete.
Then, the set of quadratic matrix inequalities
is equivalent to
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
where the last equivalence follows from taking the Schur complement of R j in A (see [13] ). Hence, our optimization problem becomes
for j = 0, . . . , M. This completes the proof.
VII. DISTRIBUTED LINEAR QUADRATIC CONTROL WITH QUADRATIC CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we will treat the distributed linear quadratic H 2 control problem with information constraints, which can be seen as a dynamic team decision problem. The idea is to transform the dynamic team problem to a static one, and then explore information structures for every time step. The information structure we will be concerned with is the partially nested information structure which was introduced in [4] .
Consider an example of four dynamically coupled systems according to the graph in Fig. 1 . The equations for the interconnected system are given by ⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣
. (25) Fig. 1 . Graph reflects the interconnection structure of the dynamics between four systems. The arrow from node 2 to node 1 indicates that system 1 affects the dynamics of system 2 directly.
For instance, the arrow from node 2 to node 1 in the graph means that the dynamics of system 2 are directly affected by system 1, which is reflected in the system matrix A, where the block A 21 = 0. On the other hand, system 2 does not affect system 1 directly, which implies that A 12 = 0. Because of the "physical" distance between the subsystems, there will be some constraints on the information available to each node.
The observation of system i at time k is given by
Here, C ij = 0 if system i does not have access to y j (k). The subsystems could exchange information about their outputs. Every subsystem receives the information with some time delay, that is reflected by the interconnection structure. Let I k i denote the set of observations y j (n) and control signals u j (n) available to node i up to time k, n ≤ k, j = 1, . . . , N. Consider the following (general) dynamic team decision problem with additional quadratic constraints:
Now write x(k) and y(k) as
Note that the summation over n is defined to be zero when t = 0. The next result is an extension of [4] for the case of optimal control with additional quadratic constraints where it presents a condition on the information structure for which a dynamic problem can be transformed to a static team problem. The condition is known as the partially nested information structure.
Theorem 6: Consider the optimization problem given by (27) with the exogenous input w = (w
that E{w * w} < ∞. The problem is equivalent to a static team problem in the form (8) if
for all n such that 0 ≤ n < t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In particular, the optimal solution to the optimization problem given by (27) is linear in the observations I . . .
Then, we can write the cost function J(x, u) as
for some symmetric positive definite matrixQ. Similarly, the quadratic constraints
may be written as 
Letȳ
. . .
With these new variables introduced, the optimization problem given by (27) reduces to the following static team decision problem:
and the optimal solutionū is linear according to Theorem 2. This completes the proof. The proof of the theorem above not only shows that the linear decisions are optimal, but also shows how to calculate the optimal decisions. Once the optimization problem (32) is solved forū, we obtain an optimal block-diagonal gain matrix K according to Theorem 3, andū =Kȳ. More explicitly, we will obtain u i = K iȳi with 0 , K i,1 , . . .) .
. . . 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have studied multiobjective linear quadratic optimization of team decisions in stochastic and deterministic settings. Constrained decision problems tend to have nonlinear optimal solutions. We have shown that for the Gaussian and worst case scenario settings, respectively, linear decisions are, in fact, optimal, and we can find the respective linear optimal solutions by solving a semidefinite program. We also showed that linear decisions are optimal when the number of players is infinite. Future work will consider an S-procedure sort of a result, where we want to find decision function μ such that the inequality J 0 (μ(x), x) ≤ 0 is satisfied if J 1 (μ(x), x) ≤ 0, where J 0 , J 1 are some quadratic forms in μ and x. However, this is a much harder problem since the search for linear a function μ(x) is not a convex problem, and it is not clear if it can be convexified.
APPENDIX
Let J = J(u, w) be a functional defined on a product vector space U × W, to be minimized by u ∈ U ⊂ U and maximized by w ∈ W ⊂ W, where U and W are the constrain sets. This defines a zero-sum game, with kernel J, in connection with which we can introduce two values: the upper valuē J := inf Proposition 2: Consider a two-person zero-sum game on convex finite-dimensional action sets U 1 × U 2 , defined by the continuous kernel J(u 1 , u 2 ). Suppose that J(u 1 , u 2 ) is strictly convex in u 1 and strictly concave in u 2 . Suppose that either: 1) U 1 and U 2 are closed and bounded; 2) U i ⊆ R m i , i = 1, 2, and J(u 1 , u 2 ) → ∞ as u 1 → ∞, and J(u 1 , u 2 ) → −∞ as u 2 → ∞. Then, the game admits a unique pure-strategy saddle-point equilibrium.
Proof: See [14, p. 177].
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